A fault diagnosis method to defend scapegoating attack in network tomography

Proceedings of TCS 2023

Xiaojia Xu1, Yongcai Wang1,*, Yu Zhang1, Deying Li1

1 School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing, 100872

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Overview

The scapegoating attack can cause persistent and inconspicuous performance degradation in network tomography. Defense of scapegoating attack is therefore a critical problem. Theoretically, the ideal defending scheme is to add monitoring paths to make all the links in the network be identifiable. This requires very high monitoring cost, which is unaffordable. To overcome this problem, this paper proposes a diagnosis-based defending scheme for scapegoating attack, which diagnoses scapegoating attack when problematic links are detected by network tomography. The latent fact is that a scapegoating attack can be launched only when the link set manipulated by the attacker cuts the probing paths going through the scapegoat links and is not traversed by any monitoring path. This cut set is called unobserved cut set (UCS). To defense, we propose to find the UCS and add the minimum number of probing paths to traverse the UCS, so that the condition of scapegoating attack is broken and the attacking links can be detected if any scapegoating attack exists. A minimum set cover model is proposed to select the least number of defense links to cover the UCS, and a polynomial time algorithm is proposed to generate the least number of probing paths to go through the selected defense links. Evaluations on various network dataset show the effectiveness of the proposed attack and defense strategies.

Contribution

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Evaluations

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Bibtex

Acknowledgment

This work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant No. 12071478, 61972404. Public Computing Cloud, Renmin University of China.